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ELDRED & THE NEW RATIONALITY 
 




Historically, the rational basis test has been a constitutional rubber 
stamp. In Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court 
applied the rational basis test and respectively held that Congress could 
extend the copyright term of existing works and restore copyright protection 
of public domain works, despite evidence that Congress intended to benefit 
copyright owners at the expense of the public. But in Lawrence v. Texas and 
United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court seems to have applied the 
rational basis test and held that state and federal laws were 
unconstitutional because they were motivated by animosity, and in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, it held that states must license marriages between 
two people of the same sex, because there is no legitimate basis to refuse. 
This essay argues that Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell may reflect the 
emergence of a “new rationality” that authorizes courts to consider 
legislative intent when evaluating the constitutionality of legislation. If so, 





1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  J.D., New York University 
School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A., University of California, 
Berkeley, 1995. The author thanks Paul Salamanca for his helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Rational basis review is famously forgiving. It provides that most legislation is 
constitutional, so long as it is conceivably related to any legitimate government 
interest, even if that interest did not actually motivate the legislation.2 Accordingly, 
in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), the Court applied rational basis review and held that 
Congress could constitutionally extend the copyright term of existing works of 
authorship, because it could have believed that doing so would promote their 
creation and dissemination.3 
But rational basis review seems to have changed since Eldred. In Lawrence v. 
Texas (2003), the Court seemingly applied rational basis review and held that a 
Texas law prohibiting homosexual conduct was unconstitutional because it was 
motivated by animosity toward homosexuals.4 In United States v. Windsor (2013), 
it held that a federal law prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages was 
unconstitutional for the same reason.5 And, most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges 
(2015), it held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license marriages 
between two people of the same sex, apparently because there is no legitimate basis 
to refuse.6 So, this “new rationality” apparently provides that legislation cannot be 
motivated by animosity, even if it is conceivably related to a legitimate government 
interest. 
This change in rational basis review presents an obvious question: Can Eldred 
survive Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell and the new rationality? In practice, of 
course, the answer is obviously “yes.”  The Court has long adhered to the maxim 
that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”7 Or rather, as Justice 
Holmes more gently observed, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.”8 
In fact, it already has. In Golan v. Holder (2012), the Supreme Court relied on 
Eldred to hold that Congress could constitutionally restore the copyright in certain 
works that had fallen into the public domain, because it could rationally believe 
that doing so could “encourage the dissemination of existing and future works” and 
induce “greater investment in the creative process.”9 
But the more interesting question is whether Eldred, Golan, and other cases 
decided under the rational basis test should survive the new rationality. If the 
standard of review has changed, why has it changed, why is that change legitimate, 
 
 
2 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
3 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003). 
5 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
6 Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571, 14–574, 2015 WL 2473451 (U.S. June 26, 
2015). 
7 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS BY RALPH WALDO EMERSON: FIRST AND SECOND 
SERIES COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME 31, 41 (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc. 1951) (1926). Also 
available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Essays:_First_Series/Self-Reliance. 
8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
9 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2012). 
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and how should it affect the way the court reviews cases under the rational basis 
test, if at all? 
 
A Potted History of Constitutional Review 
 
The Court has always assumed its authority to review the constitutionality of 
federal and state legislation.10 Most famously, in Marbury v. Madison (1803), it 
held that a federal law was unconstitutional.11  But the antebellum Court was 
reluctant to exercise the power of judicial review.12 While it occasionally held that 
state laws were unconstitutional, it did not hold another federal law 
unconstitutional until Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).13 
Notably, the antebellum Court held that its authority to review the 
constitutionality of state legislation was limited, especially in the case of legislation 
affecting individual rights. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), it held that the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to the states.14 And it assumed that it lacked the authority to 
review the constitutionality of state legislation based on the state “police power” to 
promote health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 changed the scope of 
judicial review. Initially, the Court was reluctant to expand its authority.15 But 
eventually, it held that it was authorized to review the constitutionality of all 
legislation, state and federal, based on the police power.16 And it assumed that its 
authority to review the constitutionality of legislation extended to economic 
legislation.17 
The stringency of the Court’s constitutional review of economic legislation 
reached its zenith in Lochner v. New York (1905), in which it held that the New 
York Bakeshop Act, which prohibited most bakery employees from working more 
than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week, was unconstitutional because it 
impeded the liberty of contract without a legitimate purpose.18 Specifically, the 
Court held that a police power claim cannot be “a mere pretext,” and concluded 
 
 
10 See generally Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (reviewing the constitutionality of a 
federal tax under the Taxation Clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of a state law under the Contract Clause). 
11 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803). 
12 See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (“It is but a decent respect due to 
the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to 
presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt.”). 
13 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 395-96 (1857). 
14 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248 (1833). 
15 See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, (1873). 
16 Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 291-92 (1887). 
17 See generally Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty a Louisiana law which penalized a citizen of that state for 
contracting for insurance in New York). 
18 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
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that the Bakeshop Act was not a valid exercise of the state police power because its 
“real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor . . . in a private 
business, not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real and substantial 
degree to the health of the employees.”19 In other words, the Court held that 
constitutional review obligated it to consider whether legislation was intended to 
achieve a legitimate purpose, and likely to actually achieve that purpose: “When 
assertions such as we have adverted to become necessary in order to give, if 
possible, a plausible foundation for the contention that the law is a ‘health law,’ it 
gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some other motive dominating the 
legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health or welfare.”20 
Lochner immediately became the bete noire of progressives, who argued that 
courts should defer to legislators, especially in the case of economic legislation. 
Eventually, it became synonymous with judicial overreaching.21  Commentators 
even coined the term “Lochnering” to describe illegitimate judicial review of 
economic legislation.22 Notably, Lochner was initially an outlier, although the 
Court eventually began to apply its strict standard of review in other cases.23 
In any case, Lochner didn’t last long. In Nebbia v. New York (1934), the Court 
held that a New York law creating a Milk Control Board to establish the retail price 
of milk was constitutional because the liberty of contract was not “absolute” and 
could be regulated in order to promote the general welfare, so long as the 
regulations were not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means 
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be 
attained.”24 And in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), the Court held that a 
Washington minimum wage law was constitutional because Washington “was 
entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the 'sweating system,'” and “had 
the right to consider that its minimum wage requirements would be an important 
aid in carrying out its policy of protection.”25 
Finally, in United States v. Carolene Products Company (1938), the Court held 
that a federal law prohibiting the “shipment in interstate commerce” of skimmed 
milk compounded with “any fat or oil other than milk fat” was constitutional 
because Congress could rationally believe that it was “‘an adulterated article of 
food, injurious to the public health.’"26 Specifically, the Court held: 
 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is 
to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
 
 
19 Id. at 56, 64. 
20 Id. at 62-63. 
21 David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (2003). 
22 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Reply—Lochnering, 82 TEX. L. REV. 65 (2003) (discussing judicial 
and scholarly treatment of the regulation of economic legislation). 
23 Bernstein, supra note 21. 
24 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
25 W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937). 
26 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, at 146, 146 n.1 (1938). 
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commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional 
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed 
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests 
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of 
the legislators.27  
 
And then, in the most famous footnote in constitutional history, the Court noted 
that this “presumption of constitutionality” may not apply to fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution, or to laws that affect minority groups: 
 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such 
as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally 
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . 
 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be 
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other 
types of legislation. . . . 
 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter 
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or 
national . . . or racial minorities . . . : whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.28 
 
Footnote four of Carolene Products eventually became the basis for modern 
constitutional review, which requires courts to apply three levels of judicial 
scrutiny when reviewing the constitutionality of government action, depending on 
the nature of the claim: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis.29 
 
 
27 Id. at 152. 
28 Id. at 152 n.4. 
29 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798 (2006) (“As a mode of judicial review in constitutional law 
cases, the strict scrutiny standard was first suggested by implication in the famous footnote four of 
United States v. Carolene Products.”). 
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Strict scrutiny review applies to government action that affects fundamental 
rights and certain “suspect classes,” like race, religion, and national origin.30 In 
order to survive strict scrutiny review, a government action must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest, 
and the least restrictive means for achieving that interest.31 It has become a truism 
that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” because government 
action subject to strict scrutiny review is almost always held unconstitutional.32 
Intermediate scrutiny review applies to government action that affects other 
“suspect classes,” including gender. In order to survive intermediate scrutiny 
review, a government action must be “substantially related” to the achievement of 
“important governmental objectives.”33 Scholars have argued that the Court 
developed intermediate scrutiny in order to protect groups that lack power in the 
political process.34 In any case, while intermediate scrutiny is theoretically less 
stringent than strict scrutiny, it tends to produce similar results. 
Rational basis review applies to government action that does not affect a 
fundamental right or suspect class. In order to survive rational basis review, a 
government action must only be “rationally related” to a “legitimate government 
interest.”35 Rational basis review is famously lenient. Any conceivable reason for 
the action is deemed rational, even if it is not the government’s actual reason for 
the action, and any conceivable interest is deemed legitimate, even if it is not the 
government’s actual interest.36 Under rational basis review, courts must assume 
that the government’s motives are legitimate, even in the face of evidence to the 




30 See Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We mention these matters not to 
reexamine the scope of the police power of the States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our 
view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest 
unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in 
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.”). 
31 E.g., Winkler, supra note 29, at 800-01. 
32 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (expressing the “wish to dispel the notion that 
strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’”). See also Winkler, supra note 29, at 796 (observing 
that “30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny--nearly one in three--result in the challenged law 
being upheld”). 
33 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
34 Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L. 
J. 779, 784 (1987). 
35 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). See also Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
36 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88 (“But the law need not be in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for 
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to 
correct it.”). 
37 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (“When local economic 
regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to 
2015-2016]                      ELDRED & THE NEW RATIONALITY 
 
7 
For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court applied rational basis 
review to an Oklahoma statute that, inter alia, prohibited the manufacture of 
eyeglasses without a prescription and held that the statute did not violate due 
process or equal protection, because the legislature could have had a legitimate 
reason for enacting it. Moreover, the Court explicitly stated: 
 
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, 
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they 
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought. . . . For protection against abuses by 
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.39 
 
As a consequence, challenging the constitutionality of economic legislation on 
due process or equal protection grounds soon became seen as quixotic, at best. For 
example, the Onion Futures Act of 1958 prohibited the sale of futures contracts in 
onions.40 Initially, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange filed an action arguing that 
the Act was unconstitutional and requesting an injunction prohibiting its 
enforcement.41 But when the district court applied the rational basis test and upheld 
the constitutionality of the Act, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange did not appeal 
because it considered the action hopeless.42 
 
Eldred v. Ashcroft 
 
The Court has also applied the rational basis test to actions challenging the 
constitutionality of copyright legislation. For example, the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) extended the copyright term of existing works of 
authorship by twenty years.43  
                                                                                                             
legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. . . . Unless a 
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions 
such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory 
discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their 
police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical 
exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step by step . . . , in such economic areas, 
adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination 
of the evil to future regulations. . . . In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the 
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental 
rights nor proceed along suspect lines . . . in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious 
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
38 Gunther, supra at note 32, at 8. 
39 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488-89. 
40 7 U.S.C.A. § 13-1(a) (West, current through P.L. 114-9 approved Apr. 7, 2015). 
41 Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Tieken, 178 F. Supp. 779, 780 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
42 See Russell Wasendorf, Sr., Interview with Leo Melamed, Innovation Deserves More Than 15 
Minutes of Fame, SFO MAGAZINE, June 2003, at 20, 22. 
43 Pub. L. 105-298, §102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright term was the life of the author plus fifty years. 
                                                      KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE                    [Vol. 104 8 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), petitioners argued, inter alia, that this retroactive 
extension exceeded Congress’s authority under the Intellectual Property Clause, 
because extending the copyright term of existing works does not and cannot 
“promote the Progress of Science.”44 The Court has uniformly held that the purpose 
of copyright is to encourage the production of works of authorship.45 Petitioners 
argued that extending the copyright term of an existing work cannot encourage its 
production.46 
The Court applied the rational basis test and unsurprisingly held that the CTEA 
was constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg stated, “The CTEA 
reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot 
dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain.”47 She observed that Congress 
intended the CTEA to “ensure that American authors would receive the same 
copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts,” “provide greater 
incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in 
the United States,” and “encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration 
and public distribution of their works.”48 And she concluded, “In sum, we find that 
the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess 
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however 
debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”49 
However, as Justices Stevens and Breyer pointed out in their dissents, the 
justifications provided by Congress are not credible and almost certainly pretextual. 
As Justice Stevens observed, the retroactive extension of the copyright term “will 
not even arguably promote any new works by authors or inventors,” and equitable 
concerns are “a classic non sequitur” because the “reason for increasing the 
inducement to create something new simply does not apply to an already-created 
work.”50 Moreover, as Justice Breyer observed, “no one could reasonably conclude 
                                                                                                             
The CTEA extended the copyright term to the life of the author plus seventy years. See id.; 17 U.S.C. 
302(a) (West, current through P.L. 114-25 (excluding P.L. 114-18) approved June 15, 2015). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003). Petitioners also argued 
that the extension of the copyright term violated the “limited Times” requirement of the Intellectual 
Property Clause and the First Amendment, but these claims were not decided under the rational basis 
test. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-204. 
45 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). See also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 
(1932). (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in 
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. A copyright, like a patent, is at 
once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of 
individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
46 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196 n.3. 
47 Id. at 205-08. 
48 Id. at 205-207. 
49 Id. at 208.  
50 Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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that copyright's traditional economic rationale applies here,” because the value of 
the copyright extension is too small to affect the incentives of marginal authors.51   
The claim that retroactive copyright extension provides incentives to republish 
and redistribute existing works is totally inconsistent with both the purpose of 
copyright and actual experience, which shows that public domain works are more 
readily available at lower prices than copyrighted works.52 
Finally, Justice Breyer pointed out that the actual reason that Congress 
retroactively extended the copyright term, as reflected in the legislative history of 
the CTEA, was to provide financial assistance to the entertainment industry, a 
purpose that is not consistent with the justification for copyright protection:  
 
I can find nothing in the Copyright Clause that would 
authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant's 
monopoly power, likely leading to higher prices both at 
home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher 
foreign earnings. That objective is not a copyright 
objective. Nor, standing alone, is it related to any other 
objective more closely tied to the Clause itself. Neither 
can higher corporate profits alone justify the grant's 
enhancement. The Clause seeks public, not private, 
benefits.53 
 
Indeed, as many scholars have observed, the true purpose of the CTEA was to 
prevent certain iconic copyrighted works from falling into the public domain, and 
thereby enable their owners to continue to collect monopoly rents on their use.54 As 
a result, the CTEA is often pejoratively referred to as the “Mickey Mouse 
Protection Act.”55 In fact, a scholarly consensus has emerged that rent-seeking 
legislation of this kind is improper and ought to be unconstitutional.56 However, 
this position is obviously inconsistent with traditional rational basis review of 
 
 
51 Id. at 254-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Using assumptions about the time value of money provided us 
by a group of economists (including five Nobel prize winners), it seems fair to say that, for example, a 
1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than 
seven cents today.”) (citation omitted); id. at 267 (estimating “the economic value of 1998 Act 
copyrights relative to the economic value of a perpetual copyright, as well as the incremental value of a 
20–year extension of a 75–year term”) (citation omitted). 
52 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 261 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[N]ew, cheaper editions can be expected when 
works come out of copyright”) (quoting EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT 
TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 3 (1998)).  
53 Id. at 262-63.  
54 Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and 
Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L. J. 2331, 2333 (2003) (“At the time of the 
statute's passage, a number of iconic works were on the cusp of entering the public domain, the most 
prominent being early films starring Mickey Mouse.”). 
55 Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2001). 
56 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 54, at 2332 (“With striking unanimity, scholars have called for 
aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area.”). 
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economic legislation.57 As the Court implicitly observed in Eldred, if rational basis 
review does not permit examination of the actual motives for a government action, 
then any conceivably legitimate motive will do, no matter how implausible. 
 
The “New Rationality” 
 
Under traditional rational basis review, Eldred was a foregone conclusion. But 
what if rational basis review changed to permit consideration of the actual motives 
for a government action? Can Eldred survive more searching review? And should 
it? 
It appears that rational basis review may have undergone just such a change. In 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003),58 United States v. Windsor (2013),59 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015), the Court seems to have applied rational basis review, but 
considered the actual motive for a government action or omission, rather than 
searching for a conceivably legitimate motive.60 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that a Texas law prohibiting homosexual 
conduct was unconstitutional, because it violated due process.61 The basis for the 
Court’s ruling is surprisingly unclear, because it did not specify the standard of 
constitutional review.62 However, Lawrence explicitly overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick (1986), which applied rational basis review to hold that “the presumed 
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is 
immoral and unacceptable” was a legitimate government interest.63 In Romer v. 
Evans (1996), the Court applied rational basis review to hold that an amendment to 
the Colorado Constitution violated equal protection, because it was “born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected,” which is not a legitimate 
government interest.64 The Lawrence Court relied on Romer, holding that there is 
no legitimate government interest in prohibiting homosexual conduct: “The Texas 
 
 
57 Id. at 2332-34.  
58 See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (appearing to apply rational basis to Texas’ actual interest in 
promoting morality). 
59 See generally 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (appearing to apply rational basis to the Texas’ actual interest in 
promoting morality). 
60 E.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Texas attempts to justify its law, and the 
effects of the law, by arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis review because it furthers the 
legitimate governmental interest of the promotion of morality.”); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The 
House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral 
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo–Christian) morality.’”) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, 12-13 (1996)). 
61 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
62 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 45 (2003) (“Was Lawrence based on rational basis review, or instead on 
something else? It is astonishing but true that this question is exceedingly difficult to answer.”). 
63 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560. 
64 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
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statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”65 
Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence explicitly applied rational basis 
review and concluded that the Texas law violated equal protection because it was 
intended to harm homosexuals, and “some objectives, such as a bare desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group, are not legitimate state interests.”66 And Justice 
Scalia’s dissent explicitly pointed out that the majority can only be applying 
rational basis review:  
 
I turn now to the ground on which the Court squarely 
rests its holding: the contention that there is no rational 
basis for the law here under attack. This proposition is so 
out of accord with our jurisprudence—indeed, with the 
jurisprudence of any society we know—that it requires 
little discussion.67 
 
Accordingly, it appears that the Lawrence Court applied rational basis review 
and held that the Texas law was unconstitutional because animosity toward a 
politically unpopular group is not a legitimate government interest: “[T]he fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”68 
Then, in United States v. Windsor, the Court held that a federal law prohibiting 
the federal recognition of same-sex marriages was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 As in 
Lawrence, the basis for the Court’s ruling in Windsor is unclear, because it did not 
specify the standard of constitutional review. However, it seems that the Court once 
again applied rational basis review and held that the federal law failed to advance a 
legitimate public interest because it was motivated by animosity:  
 
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to 
injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought 
to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to 
displace this protection and treating those persons as 
living in marriages less respected than others, the federal 




65 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559-60. 
66 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 560 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
69 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
70 Id. at 2696. 
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Moreover, in his dissent, Justice Scalia once again observed that the majority 
must have been applying rational basis review, albeit of a form considerably more 
stringent than historically applied:  
 
In accord with my previously expressed skepticism 
about the Court's “tiers of scrutiny” approach, I would 
review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly 
as I can tell, the Court agrees with that; its opinion does 
not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are 
taken from rational-basis cases like Moreno. But the Court 
certainly does not apply anything that resembles that 
deferential framework.71 
 
Finally, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to license marriages between two people of the same sex.72 Again, 
the basis for the Court’s holding is unclear, because it did not specify the standard 
of constitutional review. But it appears to have applied rational basis review, and 
held that there is no legitimate basis to refuse to license marriages between two 
people of the same sex. The Court did not hold that gay people are a suspect class, 
which would have required the application of strict scrutiny. Instead, it observed 
that marriage is fundamental right protected by due process, and held that the 
refusal to license marriages between two people of the same sex violates equal 
protection by preventing gays and lesbians from exercising that right: 
 
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of 
same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they 
abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws 
enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex 
couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex 
couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. 
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their 
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to 
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this 
disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and 
subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due 
Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the 




71 Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
72 Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571, 14–574, 2015 WL 2473451 (U.S. June 26, 
2015). 
73 Id. 
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Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent explicitly accused the majority of 
“Lochnering,” or constitutionalizing its policy preferences: “Ultimately, only one 
precedent offers any support for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45.”74 Roberts argued that the fundamental right of marriage provides 
only a right to marry “as traditionally defined,” which has never included a right to 
marry a person of the same sex, and that the majority’s decision was based only on 
its own policy preferences: 
 
The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than 
the majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be 
allowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would 
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny 
them this right.” . . . Whatever force that belief may have as a 
matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the 
Constitution than did the naked policy preferences adopted in 
Lochner.75 
 
So, it appears that Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell may all have applied a 
new form of rational basis review, based on Romer and other cases, under which 
courts must consider the actual motivation for a government action in determining 
whether it advances a legitimate state interest, which cannot include animosity. 
Many commentators have argued that this development should be understood as 
the gradual emergence of a new level of judicial scrutiny, “rational basis review 
with bite,” which is limited to government actions that affect particular suspect 
classes.76 Curiously, this new level of scrutiny seems indistinguishable in practice 
from intermediate scrutiny.77 Others have argued that the Court actually created, 
sub silentio, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct.78 And some 
federal courts have agreed with this reading.79 
But why not take Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell at face value and assume 
that the Court actually intended to change rational basis review, by authorizing 
courts to consider the actual motivation for government action when determining 
whether it was intended to advance a legitimate government interest? I will refer to 
 
 
74 Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 944 (1973) (coining the term “Lochnering” to describe the 
constitutionalization of judicial policy preferences). 
75 Obergefell, 2015 WL 2473451 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
76 See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Circuit's Treatment of Sexual Orientation: Defining "Rational Basis 
Review with Bite," 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142, 145-46 (2014). See also Gunther, supra 
at note 32, at 18-19 (arguing that several “minimal scrutiny” cases applied a standard with “bite”). 
77 See Pettinga, supra note 34, at 779-80. 
78 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). 
79 See, e.g., Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what 
the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis 
review.”). 
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this apparent change in the application of the rational basis test as the “new 
rationality.” But the terms of the new rationality remain unclear.  
If the new rationality requires courts applying the rational basis doctrine to 
consider the actual motives for a government action, rather than hunting for any 
conceivably legitimate motive, which motives are legitimate and which are not? In 
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, the court held that animosity is not a 
legitimate motive, and explicitly rejected religious justifications for legislative 
decisions. That stands to reason, although as Justice White observed in Bowers, “if 
all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”80 
Are any other motives illegitimate under the rational basis test? Several 
scholars have argued that the new rationality should also extend to rational basis 
review of economic legislation. For example, David Bernstein has argued that 
Lawrence and other substantive due process cases reflect a gradual return to the 
form of judicial review applied in Lochner.81 And Randy Barnett has argued that 
Lawrence reflects the wholesale importation of libertarian values into constitutional 
review.82 
Some federal judges seem to agree. Several courts have held that economic 
legislation failed the rational basis test because its actual purpose was economic 
protectionism. For example, in Craigmiles v. Giles (2002), the Sixth Circuit held 
that rational basis review does not require courts to accept pretextual justifications 
for government actions, and that economic protectionism is not a legitimate 
government interest.83 In Merrifield v. Lockyer (2008), the Ninth Circuit held that 
rational basis review does not require courts to accept irrational justifications, and 
that economic protectionism is not a legitimate government interest.84 In St. Joseph 
Abbey v. Castille (2013), the Fifth Circuit held that rational basis review requires 
courts to identify an actual rational basis for believing that a government action 
would advance a legitimate government interest, and that economic protectionism 
 
 
80 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
81 David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental 
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L. J. 1, 52 (2003). 
82 Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 21 (2002-2003). See also Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 609, 652 (2011). 
83 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (“No sophisticated economic analysis is 
required to see the pretextual nature of the state's proffered explanations for the 1972 amendment. We 
are not imposing our view of a well-functioning market on the people of Tennessee. Instead, we 
invalidate only the General Assembly's naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents 
that funeral directors extract from consumers. This measure to privilege certain businessmen over others 
at the expense of consumers is not animated by a legitimate governmental purpose and cannot survive 
even rational basis review.”). 
84 Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Indeed, the record highlights that the 
irrational singling out of three types of vertebrate pests from all other vertebrate animals was designed to 
favor economically certain constituents at the expense of others similarly situated, such as Merrifield.”). 
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is not legitimate.85 And in Wildcat Moving v. Zawacki (2013), the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky applied Craigmiles and held that 
a Kentucky law regulating intrastate moving failed the rational basis test because 
its sole purpose was “to protect existing moving companies from outside economic 
competition.”86 
Of course, these cases appear to be facially inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent. Specifically, in New Orleans v. Dukes (1976), the Supreme Court held 
that a New Orleans ordinance prohibiting pushcart food vendors in the French 
Quarter, with a “grandfather clause” that provided an exception for certain long-
time vendors, passed the rational basis test, because: 
 
The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were 
less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in 
continued operation in the Vieux Carre and that the two vendors 
who qualified under the "grandfather clause"—both of whom had 
operated in the area for over 20 years rather than only eight—had 
themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm 
that distinguishes the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these 
judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a 
constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.87 
 
Essentially, the Dukes Court held that courts should not question the rationality 
of economic legislation explicitly overruling Morey v. Doud (1957), the last case in 
which it had overruled economic legislation as irrational.88 
And yet, the Supreme Court seems newly concerned by government action 
based on economic protectionism. For example, in North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission (2015), the Court held that the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners was not entitled to state-action antitrust 
immunity because it was not actively supervised by the state.89 The Board of 
 
 
85 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 423, (2013) 
(“Mindful that a hypothetical rationale, even post hoc, cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board's 
chosen means must rationally relate to the state interests it articulates, we turn to the State Board's 
proffered rational bases for the challenged law. Our analysis does not proceed with abstraction for 
hypothesized ends and means do not include post hoc hypothesized facts.”). 
86  Bruner v. Zawacki, No. 3:12-57-DCR, 2013 WL 2903241 (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2013). 
87 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976). 
88 Id. at 306 (“Actually, the reliance on the statute's potential irrationality in Morey v. Doud, as the 
dissenters in that case correctly pointed out, . . . was a needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the 
State's legislative powers, and we have concluded that the equal protection analysis employed in that 
opinion should no longer be followed. Morey was the only case in the last half century to invalidate a 
wholly economic regulation solely on equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that the 
decision was erroneous. Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly recognized, essentially 
indistinguishable from this case, but the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in 
cases of exclusively economic regulation that it should be, and it is, overruled.”) (citing Morey v. Doud, 
354 U.S. 457, 474-75 (1957) (citation omitted)). 
89 N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. F.T.C., 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104 (2015). 
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Dental Examiners was a state regulatory body composed primarily of practicing 
dentists, which prohibited non-dentists from offering teeth-whitening services that 
do not require medical skill. The FTC argued that the Board’s action violated 
federal antitrust law, but the Board responded that it was entitled to state-action 
antitrust immunity. While the Court did not actually apply the rational basis test, it 
was clearly concerned about the legitimacy of the Board’s action. Indeed, Justice 
Alito’s dissent explicitly argued that the majority’s opinion was motivated by 
opposition to economic protectionism:  
 
When the Court asks whether market participants control the 
North Carolina Board, the Court in essence is asking whether this 
regulatory body has been captured by the entities that it is 
supposed to regulate. Regulatory capture can occur in many 
ways. So why ask only whether the members of a board are 
active market participants? The answer may be that determining 
when regulatory capture has occurred is no simple task. That 
answer provides a reason for relieving courts from the obligation 
to make such determinations at all. It does not explain why it is 
appropriate for the Court to adopt the rather crude test for capture 
that constitutes the holding of today's decision.90 
 
Eldred & the New Rationality 
 
If the new rationality prohibits economic protectionism—or rather, 
corruption—an Eldred survive the new rationality? In practice, of course it can. 
The Court can do whatever it likes, and it is perfectly capable of turning a blind eye 
to corruption, if it so chooses. In fact, Eldred has already survived the new 
rationality. In Golan v. Holder (2012), it relied on Eldred to hold that Congress 
could restore copyright protection of works that had fallen into the public domain.91 
In particular, the Court held that the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to grant 
copyright protection in order to promote both the creation of new works and the 
dissemination of existing works, and Congress could have believed that restoring 
copyright protection of existing works could encourage their dissemination.92 In 
other words, the Court applied the traditional rational basis test, rather than the new 
rationality. 
The more interesting question is, should Eldred and Golan survive the new 
rationality? And that is a question that has been percolating for quite some time. 
Ever since Eldred was decided, scholars have recognized that requiring courts to 
consider the actual motives for copyright legislation would inevitably invoke the 
 
 
90 Id. at 1123. 
91 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2012). 
92 Id. 
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spectre of Lochner.93 As a consequence, they have argued that courts should defer 
to Congress when reviewing copyright legislation, and by extension, that courts 
should defer to legislatures when reviewing economic legislation.94 
And yet, perhaps they overstate their case. The traditional reason for rejecting 
Lochner and its more stringent review of economic legislation is that courts should 
respect the democratic process, even if it results in government action unlikely to 
achieve welfare-maximizing ends.95 Or rather, as Justice Holmes put it, “if my 
fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.”96 
But what if economic legislation is not the result of the democratic process? 
What if it is the result of corruption? Should courts defer to all economic 
legislation, even in the face of evidence of corruption? The justification for judicial 
deference is that courts should respect government actions based on majority 
opinion. As Justice Stevens observed: 
 
I think it appropriate to emphasize the distinction between 
constitutionality and wise policy . . . [A]s I recall my esteemed 
former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous 
occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from 
enacting stupid laws.”97 
 
But Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell held that courts should not respect 
government actions based on animosity, because animosity is not a legitimate basis 
for government action. Neither should courts respect government actions based on 
corruption, because it is not even an expression of majority opinion, it is just a 
means of rent-seeking. As other commentators have noted, “[w]ith the appearance 
in the circuits of a new series of cases applying ‘rational basis with bite,’ one might 
ask whether underlying them is another normative change, one of growing public 
disapproval of rent-seeking and special-interest legislation.”98 
In other words, perhaps the “new rationality” should be understood to provide 
that courts may consider legislative intent, but not legislative wisdom. Of course, 
legislative intent may be diffuse and difficult to discern. And yet, courts routinely 
consider the intent of non-economic legislation. Indeed, the purpose of strict and 
intermediate scrutiny is essentially to enable courts to review the intentions 
 
 
93 See generally Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 54. 
94 Id. 
95 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (“The received 
wisdom is that Lochner was wrong because it involved ‘judicial activism’: an illegitimate intrusion by 
the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government.”). 
96 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935, 248, 249 
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press 1953). 
97 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
98 Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis With Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 1055, 1086 (2014). 
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motivating government action that affects fundamental rights and minority groups. 
While the stakes are high, because the protecting fundamental rights and minority 
groups is of paramount importance, there is also room for legitimate disagreement 
on normative grounds as to what counts as a fundamental right and how minority 
groups ought to be protected. By contrast, corruption and rent-seeking are 
considerably easier to identify.  
So, perhaps the new rationality provides that government action can be foolish, 
but cannot have improper motives, like animosity or corruption. Courts can and do 
review the motives for government action. There is no reason for them not to 
review for both animosity and corruption. And there is no reason to believe that the 
public will object. In fact, it is far more likely that the public will object to 
invalidation of government action based on animosity than that it will object to the 
invalidation of government action based on corruption. 
It goes without saying that Eldred and Golan would not fare well under this 
“new rationality.” No one seriously believes that the CTEA was intended to do 
anything but benefit the owners of valuable copyrights that were nearing the end of 
their term. Any degree of scrutiny more searching than the Court’s credulous 
acceptance of Congress’s absurd justifications would require reversal. But it 
remains to be seen whether the Court will follow this new line of doctrine to its 
logical conclusion. 
